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ABSTRACT We present a broadcast protocol that enables to remove some re
ceivers by updating a key used for encrypting transmission The scheme is based
on a set of keys properly distributed among users Our protocol requires relatively
small transfer for updating the set of authorized users In a system with n users
our protocol requires    c   log
c
n keys per user To exclude k users it needs to
broadcast    log
c
n   k symmetric ciphertext blocks
Our construction outperforms simple treelike key designs and is a good al
ternative for polynomialbased protocols like the one of Watanabe et al using
asymmetric cryptography
Known polynomialbased protocols require a broadcast of length Ok for
removing k users We get the same message size by setting c  n
 d
for some
constant d  It would result in giving   n
 d
 d keys to each user If users are able
to store so many keys then our protocol appears to be useful since it requires
much less computation time and is better if we want to update the set of users
quite often
 Introduction
We consider a situation where lots of data is broadcasted to a group of users
like in a payperview TV To make the service available only for the registered
users the whole transmission must be encrypted One of the main problems is
how to change the set of users who may decrypt the broadcasted data This
paper concentrates on the problem of removing groups of unwanted users
In general it is likely that other actors not users obtain the broadcasted
information However the transmitted data will be encrypted and nonusers will
not be able to decode it in fact we will make our system resistant to attacks
of groups of cooperating users which is a stronger property Therefore we
will consider the broadcaster and the registered users as the only actors of the
described scenario
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We assume that there exists a reliable symmetric key encryption method We
will use such a method to encrypt broadcasted data The problemwe concentrate
on is to deliver a new symmetric key called a broadcast key to users who are
entitled to decrypt the broadcasted data without revealing it to the others We
provide a solution that is based on a proper assignment of symmetric keys
   Problem description
In our model there is a broadcast channel a broadcaster and many receivers
called users We assume that broadcaster has unlimited storage and is capable
to perform complicated computation Typically receivers are small computing
units with limited storage The users are given unique identiers eg numbers
from 	 to n   When a user registers in the system he may be given appro
priate keys for the later user management procedures Further communication
with the user is limited to his listening to what is broadcasted in the public
broadcast channel
Users and user slots In the broadcast system described there is a constant set
of user slots To register an actor as a new user of the system the broadcaster
uses some free user slot When an actor becomes a new user he receives secret
information of his user slot To enable such 
user addition a certain amount
of free user slots is necessary in the system A possible solution is to make the
number of user slots in the system twice bigger than it is needed when the
system is built When there are no free slots left a reconstruction of the system
is necessary to 
introduce a new user
Inactivating users instead of removing them Since we decided that the set of
user slots is constant we need to simulate the operation of 
removing a user
Each user in our system is in one of the two possible states active or inactive
Active users are those who have the current broadcast key and may decrypt
broadcasted data At the beginning all users are active authorized To 
re
move a user disable him to decrypt the transmission the system makes him
inactive To change the set of active authorized users the broadcaster gener
ates a new broadcast key and distributes it only to users who should be active
Some protocols allow reactivating a user without changing the broadcast key
by 
giving him the current broadcast key
System works in phases There are two alternating types of system activity
regular broadcast phase and users management phase In this paper we con
centrate on the second type of systems activity Each 
regular broadcast phase
uses some broadcast key for encrypting the transmitted data When describing
a 
users management phase we will sometimes refer to a broadcast key of
some past 
regular broadcast phase denoted by K
old
 and the key of the next

regular broadcast phase denoted by K
new


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Using old broadcast keys Generally an old broadcast key K
old
may be used
while distributing K
new
 Let A
old
denote the set of users that received K
old
and A
new
denotes the set of users that should receive K
new
 It is usually useful
to think of distributing K
new
as of taking some old set of authorized users A
old

removing some set of users R from A
old
 and possibly adding reactivating some
users to result in a set A
new
 The cost of distributing K
new
depends mainly on
the number of users being removed The usage of K
old
may reduce the transfer
volume because it enables an easy elimination of users out of A
old
 In order
to take the full advantage of old broadcast keys when distributing K
new
 users
should store some of these keys Nevertheless the possible policies of storing
old broadcast keys are not the part of our interest and are not discussed in this
paper
Important parameters The problem we will concentrate on is how to remove k
out of n users in the system The purpose is to minimize both the transmission
length a protocol requires when removing users and the number of keys one
user has to store We are mainly interested in the asymptotic behavior of these
parameters However when real live applications are concerned a solution should
behave well for n  	

and k  n  When designing our protocol we aimed to
make it applicable for such values of these parameters
  Possible solutions
In this section we describe several user removal methods These based on sym
metric encryption seem to t into the following framework
Framework for symmetric protocols In order to remove inactivate some set
R of users the broadcaster
 generates a new broadcast key K
new

 chooses a subset F
R
of the distributed keys that will be used to provide
K
new
to authorized users
 for each f
i
 F
R
prepares a message M
i
 E
f
i
K
new
 by encrypting
K
new
with a symmetric key f
i

 broadcasts messages M
i

After such an operation each user attempts to decrypt each of the messages
M
i
with each of the symmetric keys he was given If the number of messages
M
i
and the number of keys each user stores are both quite big it would be
reasonable to tell the user which key was used to encrypt M
i


 
We may easily produce appropriate keys identiers with a hash function and attach to
each of messages M
i
an identier I
i
 A user that have received a pair M
i
 I
i
 knows that he
should use a key f
i
to decrypt M
i


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Usage of this framework results in providing K
new
to all users that know at
least one of the keys f
i
 F
R

Ad hoc solution The simplest idea is to give each user his individual sym
metric key When updating the broadcast key a new key K
new
is encrypted
individually for each authorized user with his key and broadcasted This requires
transmission of length On for every update
If each user keeps a single key shared with the broadcaster it is impossible to
reduce signicantly the transmission volume comparing to the ad hoc solution
see 
Treelike solutions There is a group of protocols corresponding to treelike key
distributions Imagine a binary tree with users in its leaves and symmetric keys
in all its nodes Each user knows logn keys namely the keys on the path from
his leaf to the root of the tree
When removing users we use the framework  To remove a set R of k
users the set of keys F
R
is chosen as follows A leaf of the tree is called dirty i
a user u corresponding to this leaf is being removed u  R A node v is dirty
i the subtree rooted at v contains a dirty leaf F
R
is the set of such nodes u
where u is not dirty but u has a dirty father in the tree
Proposition  Using the above described method it is possible to remove
k users by broadcasting Ok  log

n ciphertexts
P r o o f  When k users are being removed at most k  log

n nodes of the
tree are dirty Each dirty node has at most one child that is not dirty Hence
there are at most k  log

n nodes in F
R

Faster removal of a single user It is possible to modify the above described
schema by taking a tree of higher degree Again there is a key in each node of
the tree but the distribution of these keys to the users is dierent
Let P
l
denote a path from leaf l to the root of the tree The user in a leaf l
knows the key in node v i v is a son of a node u  u  P
l
 and v  P
l
 User
removal is described according to the common framework  The set F
R
of
keys to be used is chosen as follows To remove a user in a leaf l the broadcaster
uses keys from vertices v  P
l

Such a protocol needs a broadcast of Olog
d
n ciphertexts to remove a single
user and Od  log
d
n keys per user where d is a degree of the tree This
method requires lower transmission volume than the one with a binary tree It
is however unacceptable for real applications because it is impossible to remove
a pair of cooperating users
Polynomial based solutions Another group of solutions is based on polynomial
interpolation and asymmetric cryptography These protocols use the fact that

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one cannot reconstruct a polynomial of degree k from values of this polynomial
in k points while k   values suce
In the paper  A n z a i et al presented a protocol that requires a broadcast
of length Ok for removing k users In their method each user has a key which
size is independent from n and k  Unfortunately in this solution each user must
perform Ok modular exponentiations when decrypting a new broadcast key
Protocol from  requires only O modular exponentiations per update
but it is insecure when used repeatedly see  In  another protocol was
proposed by W a t a n a b e et al It allows a multiround usage and requires Ok
modular exponentiations but most of the computation might be performed in
a preprocessing phase
Random key distributions A broadcast encryption method based on randomly
distributed hashed symmetric keys was recently proposed by R amk u m a r 
Such a solution for the price of storing more keys per user provides a low cost
removal of users Moreover it enables to implement the system that gives each
user the possibility to broadcast his signal to any chosen subset of users
  Our contribution
We propose a protocol that is a generalization of treelike key distribution pro
tocols It enables removing an arbitrary number of users at once like in a simple
binary tree which is better than in  where at most k

users could be removed
k

is a protocol parameter
In our solution removing k users requires broadcasting log
c
nk symmetric
ciphertext blocks In the construction we propose each user must store clog
c
n
symmetric keys These parameters are almost like for a tree of degree c  and
removing the users one by one Our contribution might be interpreted as a
modication of a tree method to enable a removal of any subset of users at once
Our method performs well in practice For 	

users we might choose c  
and have 	 keys per user Broadcasting 	  k symmetric ciphertext blocks
would then suce to remove k users
 New user removal protocol
Here we present our protocol for removing unwanted users To describe it we
use the framework  The core of our construction is a proper distribution of
symmetric keys that will be used for the removal procedure
Let U  f	    n g be the set of identiers of users in the broadcast system
We construct a family S of subsets of U  Each subset s  S corresponds to
a key k
s
that is known exactly to the users with identiers from s and to the
broadcaster All logs in this section are to base  unless stated otherwise

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  Construction of family Sc n
The parameters are a constant c and the number of usersuser slots n  We
put all user identiers on a circle and take subsets of identiers corresponding
to arcs of this circle
For 	   x  y  n let hx y be dened as
hx y 
 

a  U  x   a  y

 y  n 

a  U  x   a  a  y   n

 otherwise 
Definition  A layer Ll s is dened as
Ll s 
n
hx y  x  s  i mod n  y  x  l mod n  i 

	     
l
n
s
m
  

o

Intuitively it is a family of intervals with length l and shift s see Figure 
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
l=16
n=32
s=4
Figure  Example of a layer
 L  for n  
Definition  A level Lvl s is a sum of layers with shift s and lengths
s s     
dloglse
 s  Formally
Lvl s 

ifdlog lseg
L
i
 s s
L(l, s)
L(2*s, s)
L(s, s)
Lv(l,s)
Figure  Composition of a level from layers

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S(c, n)
Lv(c, 1)
Lv(c^2, c)
Lv(n, n/c)
Figure  Composition of the family Sc n from levels
Definition  Family Sc n is composed as a sum of Levels
Sc n 

ifdlog
c
neg
Lvc
i
 c
i
 
 Main properties
Let us rst estimate the number of keys that a user must keep
Lemma  Each user identier is a member of at most cdlog ce dlog
c
ne
sets in Sc n  and if c is a power of  and n is a power of c each user identier
is a member of at most   c  log
c
n sets in Sc n 
P r o o f  It is an easy observation that if s divides n  then in any layer
Ll s there are at most

l
s

sets containing any user identier In case n is not
a multiply of s  some of the rst l identiers may occur

l
s

  times
We now concentrate on levels In a level Lvl s there are dlog lse  layers
We rst deal with the case when l  s  
r
for some integer r it happens when
c is a power of  and l divides n this is true when n is a power of c If these
conditions hold we may count occurrences of any identier in sets from a level
Lvl s as follows it occurs
l
s
times in a layer Ll s 
l
s
in a layer Ll s 
l
	s
in Ll s       in Ls s  Summing up there are  
l
s
  sets containing
identier i in a level Lvl s for any identier i  U 
If we drop the assumptions on the parameters l  s and n  we might get an
extra layer that would at most double the number of identier occurrences and
the number of occurrences in each layer may be increased by  It gives at most
 
l
s
 dlog lse occurrences in a level Lvl s 
Finally we get to the family Sc n  It is constructed as a sum of dlog
c
ne
levels Lvc
i
 c
i
  If c is a power of  and n is a power of c  there are c  
occurrences in each level and therefore less then   c  log
c
n occurrences of an
identier in the whole family Sc n 
Generally there are at most c dlog ce occurrences in each level and there
fore at most c  dlog ce  dlog
c
ne occurrences of an identier in the whole
family Sc n 

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In particular without the assumption that n is a power on c we get an addi
tional level without the assumption that c is a power of  we get an additional
layer for each level and for some users an additional occurrence per layer
The next lemma indicates that any set of users can be quickly removed
Lemma  Let R  U and jR j   k  Then there is a set S
R
 Sc n such
that U nR 
S
sS
R
s and jS
R
j     dlog
c
ne  k 
A proof of this lemma will be given at the end of the next subsection
In order to remove a set of unwanted users R we use the family S
R
from
Lemma  Keys corresponding to sets in S
R
are used for the removal proce
dure as described in framework  For each s  S
R
the new broadcast key is
encrypted with the key k
s
 The ciphertexts obtained this way are sent through
the broadcast channel Each authorized user i i 	 R nds s  S
R
such that
i  s  and retrieves the new broadcast key from the ciphertext using k
s

 Choice of keysconstruction of S
R
To prove Lemma  we give an algorithm constructing a set S
R
 One step of
the algorithm is a choice of a set from Sc n  Let A  U n R be the set of
authorized users and let S
curr
be the family of already chosen sets
Let
C 

sS
curr
s
be the set of users that would receive a new broadcast key K if we send it to
all users from sets within family S
curr
 Initially both S
curr
and C are empty
During an execution of the algorithm C  A ie the set C never contains any
removed user
To explain the usage of sets from the family Sc n we name some char
acteristic congurations of elements from R and C  When describing these
congurations we need to have users ordered in a circle like in 
We say a is the right neighbor of b and b is the left neighbor of a i
a  b   mod n 
Definition  We say that users u

 u

     u
h
form a hole i all the fol
lowing conditions hold
 u
i
is the right neighbor of u
i
for i        h  
 u
i
 A n C for i        h 
 the left neighbor of u

is in R 
 the right neighbor of u
h
is in R 

EFFICIENT REMOVAL IN BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
At the beginning the set A may be interpreted as a collection of holes Each
hole is treated independently thus the whole algorithm is nothing more than
lling in one hole after another We need one more notation to analyze this
lling in process
Definition  We say that users u

 u

     u
h
form a left side hole of size
h with buer size b i there are users u
h
 u
h
     u
hb
such that all the
following conditions hold
 u
i
is a right neighbor of u
i
for i        h b  
 u
i
 A n C for i        h 
 left neighbor of u

is in R 
 u
i
 C for i  h  h      h b 
In other words a left side hole is a segment of h users that must get the
new key K  it has a user which is being removed at the left end and another
b users that have already received K at the right end The denition of a right
side hole is symmetric
Definition  We say a left right side hole ts into level i i its size h
is at most c
i
and its buer size b is at least c
i

Lemma  Given a left right side hole u

 u

     u
h
that ts into level
i    there is a set s
i
 Sc n such that if we add s
i
to S
curr
the remaining
left side hole u

 u

     u
h
 
right side hole u
h
 
 u
h
 

     u
h
 will t into level
i   
P r o o f  We choose the leftmost rightmost set from the layer Lc
i
 c
i

that does not contain the left neighbor of u

right neighbor of u
h
 See Fig
ure 
 
 


R
h < c^i b > c^i
new interval of length c^i
less than c^(i−1) users remaining 
users who have already received a new key
Figure  Filling a left side hole
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Lemma  x sets from the family Sc n suce to ll in a left right side
hole that ts into level x 
P r o o f  It is a simple induction on x 
If x   the left right side hole size is h   c  Recall that Sc n contains
Lvc  In turn Lvc  contains intervals that start at arbitrary locations
and have lengths which are powers of  not exceeding c 
If x   we use Lemma  as an induction step
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 
P r o o f o f L e m m a 
Since there are k users to be removed the set of authorized users A  U nR
is a sum of at most k holes We ll each hole using at most   dlog
c
ne sets from
Sc n 
For a given hole H  fu

 u

    u
h
g we choose a layer L  Sc n which
contains an interval of the highest length among intervals from Sc n that are
subsets of H  We choose the leftmost interval s
l
and the rightmost interval s
r
from L  See Figure 
Observe that js
l

s
r
j  	 Otherwise there would be s
sup
 Sc n such that
js
sup
j  js
l
j  and s
sup
 H  and it contradicts our choice of layer L 
Let Lvl s be the level in Sc n containing layer L  Let i be an integer
such that s  c
i
 Since we have chosen the leftmost and the rightmost interval
from L that are inside H  the remaining users in this hole form one left and
one right side hole that t into level i i   dlog
c
ne    From Lemma  it
suces to use i sets from Sc n to ll each of them
 
 


 
 


R R
Figure  To ll in a hole we start with the leftmost and the
rightmost interval from longest intervals contained in the hole
 Alternatives for S c n
In this section we discuss a possibility to nd a family F of subsets of U better
for building a user removal protocol Each subset s  F corresponds to a key
k
s
that is known exactly to the users form s and to the broadcaster To remove
a set R of users from the system we need to construct a set A  U n R of
authorized users from sets s  F 
	
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This construction may be a simple sum like in framework  or a more
complicated composition For example we may use intersection of two subsets
by sending one part of a secret information encrypted with the rst key and
the other part encrypted with the second key If decoding further transmission
requires both parts of the secret exactly the users from the intersection of sets
corresponding to the used keys will have sucient information to remain active
There is a serious disadvantage of any construction using intersections If we
would like to remove two users and they together have both parts of the secret
they may exchange information and remain active It seems to be an interest
ing question whether using intersections could reduce the transmission volume
signicantly This paper however concentrates on the constructions based on
sums as in framework 
  Strongly selective families and their application to user removal
problem
Definition  Let k   n  A family F of subsets of f	      n   g is
n kstronglyselective if for every nonempty subset Z of f	      n  g such
that jZj   k and for every element z  Z there is a set F in F such that
Z 
 F  fzg 
Strongly selective families SSF also called superimposed codes are well
described in the literature see 
Consider a broadcast system where symmetric keys are distributed according
to some family F of subsets of user identiers The following lemma gives a
necessary and sucient condition for the family F to allow a removal in the
sense of framework  of any set of at most k users in this system
Lemma  Let U  f	      n  g  F  PU and k  n  Then for any
R  U  such that jR j   k  there exists a set F
R
 F such that U nR 
S
sF
R
s
if and only if the family F is a n k  stronglyselective family
P r o o f  The 
ifpart
Let F be a n kstronglyselective family Let R be any subset of U with
at most k elements We will show that for any element x  U nR there exists a
set F
x
 F such that jF
x

R j  	 and x  F
x
 Let us take Z  R  fxg  and
from the denition of n kstronglyselective family there exists a set F
x
 F
such that F
x

Z  fxg  Then the family F
R

S
xUnR
F
x
has the desired property
where U nR 
S
FF
R
F 
The 
only if part
If F is not a n k  stronglyselective family there exists a set Z such
that jZj   k and there is an element x  Z such that for any F  F either

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

Z n fxg
F


 	 or x  F  Let R  Z n fxg  We show that there is no family
F
R
 F such that U nR 
S
FF
R
F  Suppose there exists such family F
R
 There
are two cases possible

FF
R
x  F then x  U nR  x 


FF
R
F
	


FF
R
x  F then 
yRF 
y 


FF
R
F
	
 y  U nR 
Each of the cases results in a contradiction which completes the proof
 Known bounds on the size of SSF
There are some bounds known for the minimal number of sets n kstrongly
selective family must contain
The following theorem gives a nonconstructive upper bound
Theorem  For any n   and k   there exist n kstronglyselective
families of size Ok

logn 
The proof of this theorem is based on a probabilistic argument The proba
bility that a random family is a strongly selective family is too small to give a
simple randomized algorithm for constructing such families
The following theorem indicates that smaller strongly selective families do
not exist
Theorem  Let F be a n kstronglyselective family
 If    k  
p
n    then jFj 
k

 log k
logn 
 If k 
p
n  then jFj  n 
In the context of the problem of removing users the size of the family corre
sponds to the number of keys in the whole system For it is only the broadcaster
which stores all these keys and we assumed it has a huge computational power
and unlimited storage we do not intend to optimize the total number of subsets
in the family
The important parameters are the number of keys per user and the trans
mission length needed for removing k users Trying to minimize only one of
them results in extremal solutions When minimizing only the number of keys
per user we may take the family of all singletons with elements from U give
each user his own key This is the ad hoc solution mentioned in Section  If
we concentrated only on the transmission length we would take the family of
all subsets of U  and would enable the session key update with a transfer of a

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constant length This family however cannot be used due to the exponential
in n number of keys each user must store When thinking about systems with
number of users n  	

 we may not aord having more than On keys In
case receivers are small computing units eg chip cards the number of keys
they may store is much less then a thousand
We consider our construction of family Sc n as a compromise between
minimizing the number of keys and the transmission length
 Conclusion
This paper presents a protocol for ecient removal of users from an encrypted
broadcast channel Our protocol uses symmetric cryptography and among sym
metric protocols it requires the shortest transfer to remove groups of cooperating
users Compared to asymmetric cryptography protocols like in  it requires less
computational power of receivers and allows frequent updates of the authorized
users set
Another important issue is the hardware support of encryption and decryp
tion especially at the receivers side Nowadays there is much more hardware sup
port for symmetric cryptography protocols which makes these protocols more
practical and realizable for small computing units
An intriguing problem that remains unresolved is nding a nontrivial lower
bound on the transmission length depending on the number of keys one user can
store Another interesting question is whether there is a more eective protocol
that for any set R of users we would like to exclude enables an exclusion of set
R

of users which diers from R very little eg jR n R

j  c for some small
constant c and R

 R
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